Introduction
Institutional changes in telecommunications services have revolutionized the way national governments and multilateral agencies treat the sector. In Latin America, changes have been especially dramatic since new regulation has given rise to a completely different group of actors and industry structure. This chapter looks at the impact of international telecommunications agreements on Latin America. First, a framework is developed in section 6.2 in order to analyze conflicts, challenges and local interests in the telecommunications services sector. Second, multilateral and regional agreements are reviewed, namely the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Mercosur and NAFTA. The effect these agreements have had on telecommunications regulations in Latin America is analyzed in section 6.3. Finally, the chapter investigates conflicts and reactions to the new agenda. These include convergence and divergence in Latin American national policies concerning competition, propriety, safeguards, countervailing duties and antidumping measures. The argument stems from proper identification of factors affecting national telecommunications policies, including the relationship between national regulation agencies and distinct lobbies: users, equipment and service suppliers, existing regulated firms, new entrants and international agreements.
A framework for analysis
The role information technology (IT) plays in development has come to absorb increasing attention. According to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 'communications and information technology have enormous potential, especially for developing countries, and in furthering sustainable development ' (1997: 1 In fact, the availability of good information and telecommunications infrastructure is a paramount issue. A more complex question, however, is how to develop such infrastructure in a way that maximizes local interests. International forums like GATS are becoming more influential on national telecommunications strategies. However, there is no single regulation model since each uniquely depends on existing resources, capabilities, interests and influence of major economic and political agents.
Telecommunications playa dual role in economic development, as a necessary means of production and a profitable economic good. On one hand, access to telecommunications services is becoming one of the minimum conditions necessary for participation in domestic and international markets in the 'information age'. As Castells puts it: networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in process of production, experience, power, and culture. (1996: 469) Mansell and Wehn (1998) similarly argue that although it is difficult to establish links between investment in telecommunication and development, it is fairly clear that political and economic control is contingent upon the electronic communication environment.
On the other hand, telecommunications has become a key product in and of itself in the world economy. The production of telecommunications infrastructure and the information it carries are now highly valuable goods. The IT industry is the fastest growing economic sector in the world and participation in hardware, software and value-added services forms a key development strategy. IT services create highly qualified and well-paid jobs and provide opportunities for equipment, software and service firms to prosper.
Building networks linking the business sector, government institutions and society is a major task for developing countries. National policies concerning regulation of telecommunications services are affected by the nature of their relationships with major players, including both suppliers and consumers, which are usually recognized as 'local interests'. The interactions between national regulation agencies and major players are shown in Figure 6 .1. The figure provides a framework for analyzing Latin American interests in the telecommunications sector.
Equipment suppliers and users (Relationships 1 and 3) Relationships 1 and 3 look at pressure groups -telecommunications users and local equipment, software and service suppliers -directly affected by decisions made by the institutional framework regulating incumbent firms. According to Becker (1983) , pressure groups search to influence the regulation activity in favor of their own self-interest. Therefore, regulations will favor groups with political leverage.
